Aristotle first comments that there is no question of passing through an infinity in finite time since the infinities involved are the same concerning space and time (Phys. VI 2, 233a24-31). Later, he adds that it makes a difference whether the divisions in question are taken as potential or actual: difficulties arise only in the latter case which, however, requires that the movement in question be interrupted whenever a division takes place (Phys. VIII 8, 263a15-b9).
Two variants of this argument must be distinguished (see ibid. a4-11).
(DG) In Dichotomy G , infinite division takes place towards the goal of the race-course. The runner first traverses half of the race-course, then another quarter, and so forth, thus (if the race is from 0 to 1) successively being (in the case of 0) or arriving at 0, 1/2, 3/4, 7/8, ... .
(DS) In Dichotomy S , by contrast, infinite division takes place towards the starting point of the race-course. Before having traversed the whole course, the runner must have traversed its first half, and before that its first quarter, and so forth, thus successively arriving at ... 1/8, 1/4, 1/2, 1 .
In both cases, an infinity of actions are exhibited which the runner must perform. Dichotomy G makes it hard to see how the overall task can be completed. There is nothing to be done to complete it in addition to successively arriving at 1/2, 3/4, 7/8, and so forth. This must be sufficient for arriving at 1. But why? -Dichotomy S , by contrast, makes it hard to see how the task of moving from 0 to 1 can be taken up at all since there is nothing to be done first. In a sense, therefore, Dichotomy S is particularly puzzling.
(AC) Achilles. "In a race, the slowest is never caught up by the quickest" since "the pursuer must first reach the point where the pursued started, so that the slower must always hold a lead" (Phys. VI 9, 239b14-18).
Aristotle remarks (ibid. b18-29), and it is generally agreed, that this is a mere restatement of Dichotomy G .
(AR) Arrow. Assuming that (i) "everything either is at rest or moves whenever it occupies a position equal to itself" and (ii) "the moving thing is always in the now", the flying arrow is (iii) "motionless" (Phys. VI 9, 239b5-7) and, therefore, (iv) "stands still" (ibid. b30).
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This argument is based on the observation that instantaneous motion is a contradiction in terms and, hence, (v) "nothing moves in the now" (Phys. VI 3, 234a24).
(ii) and (v) entail that (iii) the arrow is always "motionless" (and evidently occupies a space equal to itself). Taken together with (i), (iii) entails that (iv) the arrow "stands still".
Aristotles comments that (vi) "time is not composed of nows" (Phys. VI 9, 239b8, . His point is that, on the one hand, "always" in (ii) and hence in the whole argument (insofar as it is valid) only refers to "nows", i.e. indivisible positions in time. But since, on the other hand, "time is not composed of nows" nothing follows concerning the extended lapses of time required by motion and rest. In particular, instantaneous rest is as much as instantaneous motion a contradiction in terms. For instance, neither motion nor rest take place in the very moment when something has finished its movement, and will thereupon be at rest (Phys. VI 3, 234a31-b9).
Since at that moment the thing in question undeniably occupies a space equal to itself, (i) is false and, hence, Zeno's argument is fallacious.
(MR) Moving rows. This argument is particularly difficult to reconstruct from Aristotle's discussion (Phys. VI 9, 239b33-240a18). It may be dismissed here since it plays no role in Whitehead.
Zeno's influence
Reactions to Zeno are already traceable in contemporary cosmology and in the Sophists. 4 The major part of Plato's Parmenides is a dialectical "exercise" formed of a series of Zeno-like arguments. Aristotle's analysis in Physics VI of motion and the continuum is evidently designed to avoid the difficulties exhibited by Zeno's paradoxes. Diodorus Cronus, by contrast, is reported to have developed Zeno's arguments and explicitly endorsed the formula "never moves, but has moved" which in Aristotle indicates the absurdity to which the assumption is reduced that time and magnitude are composed of indivisible parts.
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Subsequent philosophy was usually aware of Zeno's arguments. In particular, the "new science" of Galileo and his followers required a reconsideration of the infinities involved in continuity. "The whole labyrinth about the composition of the continuum", wrote Leibniz, "must be unraveled." 6 Kant's antinomies, in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft reflect Zeno's Dichotomy. Given the contradictions exhibited by "the old dialecticians", Hegel was happy to conclude that "motion is contradiction in actu."
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Modern scholarship was, on the one hand, deeply influenced by Tannery's claim that Zeno's arguments were not directed against common sense but, rather, against a Pythagorean doctrines describing space and time as composed of indivisible units. Only after the 1950s was this interpretation seen to be ill-founded. 8 On the other hand, Aristotle's eliminative stratagems against Zeno were successfully resumed. Thus, Russell and, more recently, Grünbaum and others 4 Anaxagoras and, particularly, the Atomists. See Kirk et al. 1983, 360 ff., 367, 408 f. argued that modern mathematics, based on set theory, provides consistent accounts of continuity and motion, including the infinities involved. But it should be also noted that modern mathematics gives rise to such novel paradoxes as Cantor's proof that the concept of cardinal number does not apply to the universe (i.e., in mathematics, the class of all classes or, more specifically, of all cardinal numbers).
9 Surprisingly, the similarity between this result and Zeno's paradox of number was rarely observed.
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In particular, Russell pointed out that Zeno's argument that "there is no such thing as a state of change" (1901, 370) does not prevent a body from being "in one place at one time and in another at another" and, hence, to "move" in the only relevant sense of that term (ibid. 371 f.). Bergson objected that this "cinematographical" description is inevitable in retrospect but fails to account for the unity of the movement which spans a duration of time and is only grasped by "installing oneself in the change" (L'évolution créative, p. 307 ff.). For Bergson, Zeno's arguments boil down to rendering absurd the notion of movement being "made of immobilities" (ibid.). Similarly but in a far less sophisticated way, James employed Zeno to confirming his view that, just as perceptual experience "grows by buds or drops", so do time, change, etc. 
Zeno in Whitehead
The In what follows, I will first examine these passages in their relation to the traditions and topics described above (Section 3.1). In the second place, then, I will describe Whitehead's use of Zeno's 9 On Cantors antinomy, see Dauben 1979, 241 ff. 10 In short, the common structure of the arguments is this. If there are many things, the question as to How many? can be answered by specifying some number x -finite in Zeno's case, finite or transfinite in Cantor's case -such that there are neither more nor less than x things. But assuming that there are no less than x things, Zeno's construction demonstrates for finite x that there must be at least 2x-1 things; Cantor's more sophisticated construction demonstrates for both finite and transfinite x that there must be at least 2 x things. Since 2x-1 > x for finite x (such that x>1) and 2
x > x for both finite and transfinite x, there are more than x things. Hence, it is not true that the question as to How many things are there? can be answered by exhibiting some number x such that there are neither more nor less than x things.
arguments, starting in the Harvard Lectures (Section 3.2) and successively including SMW (Section 3.3), and PR (Section 3.4). 
References in
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(Ext K ) "I call an extensive quantity that in which the representation of the whole is rendered possible by the representation of its parts, and therefore necessarily preceded by it. I cannot represent to myself any line, however small it may be, without drawing it in thought, that is, without producing all its parts one after the other, starting from a given point, and thus, first of all, drawing its intuition. The same applies to every, even the smallest, portion of time. I can only think in it the successive progress from one moment to another, thus producing in the end, by all the portions of time, and their addition, a definite quantity of time." (Kant, KrV A162 f. / B203) as places presupposing always those intuitions which they are meant to limit or to determine. Mere places or parts that might be given before space and time, could never be compounded into space or time.'" (Kant, KrV A169 / B211) Whitehead's point is that a Zeno-type argument proves (Ext K ) to be inconsistent with (Con K ) (SMW 126). I will return to this later. But it is worth mentioning in advance, firstly, that Whitehead misrepresents Kant by neglecting the fact that (Ext K ) and (Con K ) refer to intuition ("Anschauung") and to reality, respectively, 19 and the inconsistency in question cannot, therefore, be as straightforward as Whitehead suggests. Secondly, Whitehead's strange claim that (Con K ) "is in agreement with Plato as against Aristotle" (SMW 127, with a footnote citing "a note on Points" in Heath 1920) illuminates his, to say the least, selective way to deal with classical scholarship and with the relevant documents.
Still earlier than chapter 7 of SMW are Whitehead's Harvard Lectures of March 31 -April 11, 1925 (Ford 1984, 275-286) In addition to this, a passage in Heath's note on Euclid's Def. I 3 -"the extremities of a line are points" -is remarkable.
[7] "Aristotle alludes to a definition of a point as 'a limit of a line' (peras grammês) but objects to it on the ground that it defines what is prior by means of what is posterior, a point being in the order of thought prior to, or more fundamental than, a line, while a line is similarly prior to a surface and a surface to a solid. Aristotle contrasts what is prior in the order of thought with what is prior relatively to us. Relatively to us, a solid is prior to a surface, a surface to a line, a line to a point. This is because a solid is nearer to sense than a surface (it is the solid, as Aristotle says, which most of all 'falls under sense,' i.e. is apprehended by sense), similarly a surface is nearer to sense than a line, and a line than a point. It is addressed to a general public (p. vii: "senior boys at school," etc.). In the notes (which are designed "to make the schoolboy ... think," p. viii), much additional material is presented concerning ancient philosophy and mathematics, but the author has found it appropriate to omit (with two insignificant exceptions) all references. Full references are only given in the related passages of Heath's English edition of the Elements.
24 This is probably the "note on Points" referred to by Whitehead, SMW 127n1 (numeration in brackets is mine). 
3.2.
Three interrelated types of difficulties are described in the first lecture, of March 31, in the relevant part of Whitehead's Harvard Lectures for 1924-25. Firstly, difficulties in "the idea of alternative time systems" with which relativity theory replaces "the linear idea of becomingness" (Ford 1984, 276 going. There is nothing you can point to into which there is a transition, or is there and then created." (p. 277)
In the lecture of April 2, Whitehead observes that "Kant's statement that the parts are antecedent to the whole", i.e. (Ext K ), taken together with the claim that "every part itself is a whole", i.e. (Con K ) leads into a "vicious regress" since every part of time is again "a whole with antecedent parts." (p. 277; SMW 126 attributes this objection to Zeno). The rest of the lecture is mainly devoted to Whitehead's claim that temporal relations are "internal" (p. 278) and, accordingly, "that moment" is duly equated with "that particular concrete relatedness of that past to that future" (p. 279).
The next lecture, of April 4, presents itself as a series of historical remarks which do not seem to pertain to the present topic (p. 279-281).
In the lecture of April 7, "an atomic theory of time" (p. 281) is presented. 36 Whitehead's starting point is the "distinction between temporality and extensiveness" (ibid.) brought out by the observation that "the idea of extension doesn't include time-direction" (p. 281 -remember that relativity theory "presents us with the notion of alternative progressions in time", p. 275). Extension is only temporalized "via realization of the potential", i.e. "the individualization of each event into a peculiar togetherness. ... An event as present is real for itself. It is this becoming real which is temporalization." (p. 281 f.)
Here, Whitehead continues, "we bump up against the atomic view of things, also the subjective view" (p. 282). A "subject" is, on the one hand, "a parallelogram" in the extensive structure described by relativity theory.
On the other hand, "its reality is the realization of something as entering into its own being. The pulling together of a duration from its own viewpoint, i.e. as entering into its own essence. ... The subject is what that grasping together is." (ibid.)
The clue to "atomicity", then, is this. "The becoming real is not the production via the parts of the duration -contradicting Kant" (ibid.); that is, contradicting Kant's description in (Ext K ) of time as extensive, with successive parts "antecedent to the whole" (p. 277). The inconsistency of (Ext K ) with (Con K ) is stated without proof (but Whitehead may have referred to the regress argument presented in the lecture of April 2), and is thus commented on: "if you throw over the first [i.e. (Ext K )], you get your idea of atomic quantity" (p. 283). "The time transition", Whitehead continues, must not be conceived as a succession in becoming but, rather, as "a transition within what is already there. ... There is no relation between something and nothing." (ibid.) -Zeno is not mentioned in this lecture. But the result just stated corresponds to the principle, attributed to Zeno by Whitehead, that "process" must not be conceived "under the guise of a temporal transition into the non-existent" (p. 277)
The impact of Zeno's arguments is only adumbrated by a remark in the lecture of April 9 which summarizes the previous lectures as follows.
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"Starting with events, and bringing the future and past into it, didn't give enough differentiation. Had to introduce 'reality' as 'real togetherness', bringing in the time-idea. If you take time as merely generating the event, Zeno gets at you. There is no such thing as a moment. What must be real is the togetherness of the content of the event." (p. 283) 3.3. How and why does Zeno "get at you"? -The extant lecture notes are silent obout this. In the corresponding passage in SMW, 38 just after having quoted Kant's (Ext K ) and (Con K ), Whitehead claims that "Zeno would object that a vicious infinite regress is involved [sc. in (Ext K ), if (Con K ) is accepted]. Every part of time involves some smaller part of itself, and so on. Also this series regresses backwards ultimately to nothing; since the initial moment is without duration and merely marks the relation of contiguity to an earlier time. Thus time is impossible, if the two extracts are both adhered to. I accept the later, and reject the earlier, passage." (SMW 126)
I take it that "Zeno gets at you" in the Harvard Lecture of April 9 just in the same way as he gets at Kant in the passage of SMW 126 just quoted (which, in turn, echoes the regress argument presented in the Harvard Lecture of April 2; see above, 3.2.). 39 Accordingly, I suggest that in the Harvard Lectures, the description of "time as merely generating the event" (April 9, p. 283) corresponds to the claim, attributed to Kant, that "the becoming real is ... the production via the parts of the duration" (April 7, p. 282).
It should be noted, however, that Whitehead "is in complete agreement with the second extract" only "if 'time and space' is the extensive continuum." (SMW 126). The qualification is essential since Whitehead is, of course, not at all willing to equate time with extension. Rather, Whitehead affirms the doctrine of the Harvard Lectures (p. 281) that extension is only temporalized "via realization of the potential" as follows.
"Realization is the becoming of time in the field of extension. Extension is the complex of events, qua their potentialities. In realization the potentiality becomes actuality. ... 37 The addenda presented in the lectures of April 9 and April 11 (p. 283-286) throw no additional light on Whitehead's interpretation of Zeno. 38 Nothing is added to this by a preliminary mention of Zeno at SMW 125 and by the summary at SMW 127.
39 A similar argument, but without mentioning Zeno, reappears in Time (Ford 1984, 307 f.; cf. Ford 1999, 12 f.) .
Temporalization is realization. Temporalization is not another continuous process. It is an atomic succession." (SMW 126) In order to understand this passage, Whitehead's observation in the Harvard Lectures (p. 281) that "the idea of extension doesn't include time-direction" should be adduced. I take it that "timedirection", for Whitehead, must take the form of there being "succession", i.e. of there being earier and later events. Given Whitehead's claim that extension is only temporalized and, hence, time-direction is only imposed on the extensive continuum "via realization of the potential" (ibid.), two candidates present themselves for the succession in question.
(a) Assuming that "the becoming real is ... the production via the parts of the duration" (ibid., p. 282), a succession of temporal parts might be supposed to correspond to that production.
(b) Assuming that the "transition" in question "is in the nature of what has become real" but "hasn't become real because of the transition" (ibid.), the succession that corresponds to becoming is a transition from one antecedent duration to the duration occupied by "what has [thus] become real".
Since (a) is refuted by Zeno's arguments, "the time transition" (ibid., p. 283) is easily seen to give rise to a succession of durations each of which is atomic.
3.4.
In Process and Reality, "Zeno's method" is employed "to prove that there can be no continuity of becoming" (PR 35.32 f.) and thus to reaffirm the "epochal theory of time" of SMW, ch. 7 (PR 68.3). The relevant paragraphs at PR 68 f. are these (numeration in brackets is mine).
[1] "The argument, so far as it is valid, elicits an contradiction from the two premises: (i) that in a becoming something (res vera) becomes, and (ii) that every act of becoming is divisible into earlier and later sections which are themselves acts of becoming.
[2] Consider for example, an act of becoming during one second. The act is divisible into two acts, one during the earlier half of the second, the other during the later half of the second. Thus that which becomes during the whole second presupposes that which becomes during the first half-second. Analogously, that which becomes during the first half-second presupposes that which becomes during the first quarter-second, and so on indefinitely. Thus if we consider the process of becoming up to the beginning of the second in question, and ask what then becomes, no answer can be given. For whatever creature we indicate presupposes an earlier creature which became after the beginning of the second and antecedently to the indicated creature. 40 [3] Therefore there is nothing which becomes, so as to effect a transition into the second in question." In not the case that "every act of becoming is divisible into earlier and later sections which are themselves acts of becoming". Rather, at least some acts of becoming -actual occasions -cannot be divided into earlier and later sections which are themselves acts of becoming. Accordingly, the succession of actual occasions derives from such transitions as are required to take place in [3] . Insofar as time is this succession, Whitehead's claim that time exhibits an "epochal" structure follows immediately.
[4] "The difficulty is not evaded by assuming that something becomes at each nonextensive instant of time. For at the beginning of the second of time there is no next instant at which something can become.
[5] Zeno in his 'Arrow in Its Flight' seems to have had an obscure grasp of this argument.
[6] But the introduction of motion brings in irrelevant details. The true difficulty is to understand how the arrow survives the lapse of time. Unfortunately, Descartes' treatment of 'endurance' is very superficial, and subsequent philosophers have followed up his example." . This is not to say that (a) derives its validity from that argument. Rather, the indispensability of (a) as a principle is exhibited by the observation that the crucial step in the argument depends upon (a). In the sequel, the transitional clause "for otherwise ..." suggests that (a) is only substantiated by another principle which secures that It is not easy to state the principle required in an appropriate way. But it should be noted that the transition in question must exemplify the Principle of Creativity, that (c) "the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively." Two more passages in PR may be adduced that illustrate this conclusion.
[10] "... the extensive continuity of the physical universe has usually been construed to mean that there is a continuity of becoming. But, if we admit that 'something becomes,' it is easy, by employing Zeno's method, to prove that there can be no continuity of becoming. 46 There is a becoming of continuity but no continuity of becoming. The actual occasions are the creatures which become, and they constitute a continuously extensive world. In other words, extensiveness becomes, but 'becoming' is not itself extensive." [11] "So long as the atomic character of actual occasions is unrecognized, the application of Zeno's method makes it difficult to understand the notion of continuous transmission which reigns in physical science." Evidently, [9] is meant to correspond to the announcement in [10] , with an insignificant switch in terminology. It is claimed in [9] that, in spite of "the extensive divisibility of what has become," the relevant "act of becoming" is indivisible. 47 A contradiction seems to be implied in this since "what has become" is just the same actual occasion as the relevant "act of becoming". The contradiction is only resolved by taking the diversity of the relevant temporal perspectives, which give rise to diverse meanings of 'divisibility', into account (and thus, in a sense, by following Bergson's suggestion). 48 The doctrine that "the atomic character of actual occasions [i.e., of acts of becoming]" is compatible with "the extensive divisibility of what has become" is also presupposed in [11] ; but the issue raised in the context is far beyond the scope of the present essay.
